




The year 2005 saw a continuing increase in important international regulatory initiatives,
cases and other developments related to the control of money laundering. These issues
affected businesses and other direct market participants (in particular financial institutions)
and also their professional advisors, including attorneys. Attorneys and other so-called gate-
keepers, are often positioned to detect and deter (or, on the contrary, abet and enable)
money laundering. These gatekeepers figured prominently in many of this year's Anti-
Money Laundering (AML) developments.
II. The Third European Union Directive on
Money Laundering
It is commonly assumed that, other things being equal, AML regulation is most effective
when it is international. Uniform policies across borders reduce the possibility of regulatory
arbitrage and make compliance more feasible for the large internationally-active institutions
and organizations that are most important in the global fight against money laundering.
The Third European Union (EU) Directive on Money Laundering is an important step
toward the goal of harmonized international AML regulation.
On June 7, 2005, the Council of Ministers for Finance and Economic Affairs of the
European Union (ECOFIN) approved a new European Directive targeting money laun-
dering. The Third Directive approved by ECOFIN was in the form previously amended
by the European Parliament and, accordingly, it will become law directly upon publication.
As of this writing all final official translations are not yet released but an unofficial English
version was released on August 9, 2005, and is available on the EU website.' The Third
Directive will bring a greater level of conformity in AML enforcement among the nations
of the EU and will track more closely with the Financial Action Task Force's revised 40
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Recommendations for the Control of Money Laundering. Most importantly, perhaps, for
U.S. practitioners, the Third Directive (through such concepts as the increased use of risk-
based approaches) brings the EU approach to AML regulation more in line with that of
the United States. While important differences remain, the Third Directive contributes to
the ongoing convergence of global AML enforcement standards.
A. MUTUAL RECOGNITION
Article 11(1) of the Third Directive explicitly provides for mutual recognition of cus-
tomer identification requirements (known in the United States as Know your Customer or
KYC) among the EU states. This removes the uncertainty about the possible need for
duplicative KYC procedures in cross-border transactions within the EU.2
B. POLITICALLY EXPOSED PERSONS
Defining the so-called politically exposed persons (PEPs) has been one of the thorniest
problems of AML regulation. The regulated institutions (in particular financial institutions)
want a clear-cut definition that can be applied without uncertainty. Ideally, this would take
the form of a list of names, addresses, dates of birth, and other identifying information.
The PEPs for each regulatory jurisdiction should in theory be the same for all institutions
subject to the applicable PEP regulation. A vague and general definition coupled with
draconian enforcement can serve only as an incentive to institutions to push the scope of
the PEP definition up to the limits of practicality or beyond. From the point of view of the
regulators, however, the practical obstacles to a more specific PEP definition appear to be
currently insuperable. The reasons are not entirely clear but could range from simple lack
of resources to the fear (shared of course by the regulated) of under-inclusion.
The Third Directive makes some progress in making the PEP definition more definite
and certain, defining PEPs as "natural persons who are or have been entrusted with promi-
nent public functions and immediate family members, or persons known to be close asso-
ciates, of such persons... -" Specifying immediate family members and persons known to
be close associates is helpful and implementing legislation might make those definitions
even more clear and limited. The definition does not, however, take in other useful features
such as a risk-based standard which would eliminate the need for enhanced scrutiny of small
and/or inactive accounts. The Third Directive's PEP procedure also continues the policy
of defining foreign political figures as those outside the national territory of the member
state, as opposed to considering the entire EU as one jurisdiction for this purpose.
C. RISK-BASED APPROACH
Perhaps the most important change in the Third Directive is the explicit adoption of
risk-based compliance standards, as commonly employed in U.S. AML regulation. A risk-
based approach acknowledges that limited resources available for AML compliance should
be allocated toward situations where the actual risk of money laundering is reasonably
perceived to be higher. A variety of risk factors need to be taken into account but the basic
2. Id. at art. 11(1).
3. Id. at art. 3(8).
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standards are client characteristics, transaction types, and jurisdictions involved, again fol-
lowing U.S. practice as well as Financial Action Task Force (FATF) recommendations. Risk-
based approaches are explicitly endorsed in the Third Directive's discussion of the identi-
fication of beneficial owners and of PEPs, as well as in the application of KYC requirements.4
D. BENEFICIAL OWNERS
In the United States, push-back from the regulated community, in particular the financial
services industry, was largely successful in avoiding a general requirement for the mandatory
identification of beneficial owners of trusts and other legal entities for AML regulatory
purposes. EU AML regulation, on the other hand, has long had strong beneficial-ownership
identification requirements. This split remains, but the Third Directive changes beneficial-
ownership identification requirements to reflect some of the concerns shared by financial
institutions in the EU as well as the United States. The essential problem is that the iden-
tification of beneficial owners is often not practical because the necessary information may
not be available to the financial institution. Also, beneficial ownership once identified might
thereafter change through means not evident to the financial institution.
The Third Directive gives some relief on this point by imposing a 25 percent threshold
beneficial-ownership percentage amount as the minimum required to trigger the benefi-
ciary-identification requirement. The Third Directive maintains the requirement to iden-
tify beneficial owners but defines a beneficial owner as the natural person who ultimately,
directly or indirectly, owns, or controls 25 percent or more of the shares or of the voting
rights of a legal person.5 This 25 percent level was set after EU financial institutions objected
strongly to the original proposal for a 10 percent test.
E. SHELL BANKS
The Third Directive prohibits correspondent account relationships with shell banks. The
Third Directive definition of a shell bank is "a credit institution, or an institution engaged
in equivalent activities, incorporated in a jurisdiction in which it has no physical presence,
involving meaningful mind and management, and which is unaffiliated with a regulated
financial group"6 This conforms in substance with the definition in section 313 of the USA
PATRIOT Act.7 The Third Directive and the parallel USA PATRIOT Act also share the
challenge of complying with the prohibition against indirect correspondent relationships.
The Third Directive does not adopt a certification safe harbor provision similar to that
provided for in the implementing regulations for section 313.
E TIPPING OFF
The EU AML approach has much broader regulation than the United States against the
disclosure to account holders that information concerning their banking activities has been
requested by or delivered to governmental entities. In the United States, information con-
4. Id. at arts. 8(l)(b), 13(4); See generally id. at art. 8.
5. Id. at arts. 7(1)(b), 3(6).
6. Id. at art. 3(10).
7. USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 313, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (to be codified at 31 U.S.C. § 5318).
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cerning Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) must not be disclosed, but much other infor-
mation is not subject to tipping off prohibitions. In most cases, for example, even govern-
ment subpoenas for the production of account information may, and generally are, disclosed
by a bank to its client. Under the Third Directive, the EU practice continues; it is prohibited
to disclose to customers that their account or transaction information has been given to
government investigators.' The Third Directive has, however, adopted provisions similar
to those in USA PATRIOT Act section 314(b) for the sharing of information related to
money laundering prevention efforts among financial institutions. The EU provisions, how-
ever, are more restrictive and only allow for information sharing among commonly-owned
financial institutions, as opposed to the broader provisions of section 314. The new EU
approach does show some recognition of the real dangers created by letting the fears of
tipping off inhibit the flow of useful compliance information among financial institutions.
The EU approach also shows the practical importance of information sharing among fi-
nancial institutions in the fight against money laundering.
A related provision of the Third Directive addresses the concerns that bank staff may
have adverse consequences if they report suspicious customer activities, up to and including
threats and harassment. In the United States, the secrecy of SAR reporting and the im-
munity from liability accompanying SARs filed in good faith addresses these real concerns.
The Third Directive provides that the EU governments must take appropriate steps to
protect bank employees. 9
M. Riggs Bank
In 2005, the final act of the prosecution of the 160-year old Riggs Bank of Washington,
D.C. occurred for lax AML procedures in connection with the banking services it provided
to former Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet and senior political figures of Equatorial
Guinea. In January, Riggs pled guilty to one felony count of failure to file SARs and agreed
to a fine of $16 million, which comes on top of $25 million in previously assessed civil and
criminal penalties. 1 Riggs, once one of the most prestigious names in U.S. banking, was
subsequently absorbed by merger into PNC Bank.
In one of the most notorious recent cases finding serious AML compliance violations,
Riggs was accused of aiding Pinochet in his efforts to conceal large sums of uncertain origin.
The court also found that Riggs failed to monitor properly substantial transactions involving
senior political figures (as well as their family members) in Equatorial Guinea. Saudi Arabian
activities were also involved. Riggs was cited also for failing to file SARs in connection with
large transactions, including very large cash withdrawals, by Saudi officials in Washington,
including longtime ambassador Prince Bandar.
Cases such as Riggs, together with related cases turning on the failure to file SARs such
as AmSouth Bank of Birmingham, Alabama,I are generally thought to have contributed to
8. Council Directive 2004/0137, supra note 1, at art. 28.
9. Id. at art. 28(3).
10. In re Riggs Nat'l Corp., Docket No. 05-003-B-HC (Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.Jan. 26,
2005).
11. See In re Amsouth Bancorporation & Amnsouth Bank, Birmingham, Ala., Docket Nos. 04-021-B-HC,
04-021-B-SM, 04-021-CMP-HS, &04-021-CMP-SM, (Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. Oct. 12,
2004).
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the ever-increasing mountain of SARs being filed by U.S. financial institutions fearful of
being second-guessed. Before the Riggs case, it might have been reasonable for bank offi-
cials to fail to find anything suspicious about large cash withdrawals by individuals such as
Prince Bandar, whose wealth, position, and ongoing pattern of bank activities might well
have allowed a banker to conclude that there was nothing particularly suspicious or criminal
about his frequent need for large cash withdrawals. After Riggs and related cases, it is
unlikely that U.S. financial institutions will back off from the current record (and ever
increasing) level of SAR filings unless bank regulators provide clear safe harbor guidelines
that will hold up during the bank examination process. Such a development is not reasonably
to be anticipated.
IV. AMI in Zimbabwe: Lawyers as Gatekeepers
Zimbabwe has long been one of the world's most notorious jurisdictions for money
laundering, but in 2005 efforts were at least apparently being made to bring the country
closer to world standards. Economic convulsions over the years have led to a substantially
cash-based financial system and lax enforcement, coupled with corruption, has also con-
tributed to make money laundering a major national problem. The Reserve Bank of Zim-
babwe is creating a Financial Intelligence Unit to work with the few financial institutions
to monitor suspicious transactions and to coordinate anti-money laundering efforts. Finan-
cial institutions also would be required to appoint a money laundering reporting officer
(MLRO). The opening of accounts via the internet or through the postal service would be
prohibited and correspondent banking would be regulated in accordance with international
standards.,2
Zimbabwe's efforts to stop money laundering have extended to gatekeepers such as at-
torneys, which has threatened to create a conflict with an attorney's traditional duties to
clients. In January 2005, the Law Society of Zimbabwe mounted a constitutional challenge
to Zimbabwe's gatekeeper law, the Bank Use Promotion and Suppression of Money Laun-
dering Act, and on January 18, 2005, petitioned the Supreme Court to find parts of the Act
unconstitutional." The Act applies to a lawyer's obligations that are essentially similar to
those imposed on financial institutions, including obligations to report suspicious transac-
tions and large cash transactions and prohibitions on tipping off by notifying their clients.
V. Lawyers as Gatekeepers in Belgium
A lawyer's gatekeeper obligations under EU law have also been subject to challenge. The
Brussels Bar has initiated a challenge to the EU's AML Directive (initially the Second
European Union Anti-Money Laundering Directive, now supplanted by the Third) based
on EU human rights law. Since this is a matter of EU law, the Belgian Cour d'Arbitrage
has asked the European Court of Justice (ECJ) to review the request by the Belgian Bar.
The issue is whether the EU AML Directive infringes on the right to a fair trial as guar-
anteed by article 6 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
12. See Bank Use Promotion and Suppression of Money Laundering Act, ch. 24:24, available at http://
www.parlzim.gov.zw/Resources/Acts/web%20pages/itlde24/chapter24.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2006).
13. DELOrrrE FINANCIAL SERVICES, A MoNrrH IN MONEY LAUNDERING (Jan. 2005), available at http://www.
deloitte.com/dtt/cda/doc/content/UK-AMonthinMoneyLaundering-Jan-2005%283 %29.pdf.
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Freedoms (and article 6(2) of the Treaty on European Union) insofar as it covers lawyers
and hence imposes on them any reporting obligation that might indicate money laundering.
The Brussels Bar argues that this obligation seems, in principle, to go against guarantees
of the independence of the lawyer-understood as the right to defend her client's sole
interests from and above any influence from public authorities-and to the legal profes-
sional privileges that are the basis of the right to an efficient defense.
As of this writing, the case is still pending before the ECJ. The American Bar Association,
acting through the Section of International Law, has provided the Brussels Bar with a letter
in support of its position, prepared with the help of the International Anti-Money Laun-
dering and Professional Ethics Committee.14
'a. Lawyers as Gatekeepers in the United Kingdom:
Bowman v. Fels
Lawyers in the United Kingdom were concerned about the possible application to their
practices of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA).Y Specifically, the potential exists
under section 328 of the POCA for an attorney who simply conducted a normal piece of
litigation in an ordinary way to be held as involved in an arrangement requiring reporting
to the National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) with the threat of prosecution and
potential jail time for violations. Bowman v. Fels, decided on March 8, 2005, reversed an
earlier case and held that a lawyer acting in the normal course of litigation is not covered
by section 328.16
The case turned on the discovery by a firm during litigation that a party (not its client)
might have violated tax law. The firm filed the report it thought was required under section
328 but informed no one-not its client, not opposing counsel, and not the suspected tax
law violator represented by opposing counsel. The court concluded that section 328 did
not apply in this case, and, even if it did, it would be overruled by the traditional legal
professional privilege. This case did not, however, decide the potential impact of section
328 in normal commercial transactional work (as opposed to litigation) or settle the question
of whether an attorney who accepted payment from funds derived from criminal sources
would have committed a money laundering violation.
VII. Financial Action Task Force Initiatives
At its February 2005 plenary meeting, the FATF granted the People's Republic of China
observer status, with the possibility of admission to full membership in the future. This
action by the FATF was made after China's decision to implement the FATF Recommen-
dations, to undergo an AML evaluation, and to play an active role in the fight against money
laundering and terrorism."
14. Letter from Michael S. Greco, President, American Bar Association; Michael Byowitz, Chair, ABA
Section of International Law; & EdwardJ. Krauland, Chairperson, ABA Task Force on Gatekeeper Regulations
and the Profession, to John Bigwood, Esq. Re: Referral by the Belgian Courd'Arbitrage to the European Court
of Justice Concerning Enforceability of the Second European Union Money Laundering Directive (Nov. 11,
2005) (On file with author).
15. Proceeds of Crime Act, 2002, 29 (Eng.).
16. Bowman v. Fels, [2005] EWCA (Civ) 226 (Eng.).
17. FATF Welcomes China as Observer, Financial Action Task Force, Feb. 11, 2005, available at http://www.
fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/51/2/34423127.pdf.
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A primary task of the FATF is the maintenance of the list of Non-Cooperative Countries
and Territories (NCCTs). During 2005, the Cook Islands, Indonesia, and the Philippines
were removed from the list, following FATF visits to the countries that were effectively
implementing appropriate anti-money laundering measures to correct the problems iden-
tified by the FATF that had caused them to be placed on the NCCT list. Nauru, one of
the original and most notorious NCCT's, was also removed from the NCCT list in 2005
after it abolished the over 400 shell banks organized in the country. At the end of 2005,
the NCCT list included only Myanmar and Nigeria.,'
In addition to countries, the FATF also cooperates with regional bodies working to com-
bat money laundering and terrorist financing. Among the newer groups are the Euroasian
Group that was founded in Moscow and includes as founding members Belarus, Kazakh-
stan, Kyrgyzstan, the People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, and Tajikistan. 19
Another recent FATF-style regional body is the Middle East and North Africa FATE20
18. Press Release, Financial Action Task Force, FATF will explore the symbiotic relationship among cor-
ruption, money laundering and terrorist financing (Oct. 13, 2005), available at http://www.faff-gafi.org/data
oecd/13/36/35497629.pdf.
19. See Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and Financing of Terriorism, http://www.euro
asiangroup.org (last visited Feb. 27, 2006).
20. See Middle East & North Africa Financial Action Task Force, http://www.menafatf.org/home.asp (last
visited Feb 27, 2006).
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